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Assessing the Indo-US Deal on Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Scaling up the existing 540 MWe PHWR
reactors to 700 MWe and creating the
infrastructure to build eight additional 700
MWe reactors.
Successfully commissioning the fast
breeder reactor and adding four additional
fast breeder reactors of 500 MWe each to
the one already under construction.
Import of six reactors of 1,000 MWe each.2
As we can see from the above projection, 6,000
MWe out of the projected 20,000 MWe capacity for
2020 will have to be met through import of 6 reactors
of 1,000 MWe each. While India currently has
two 1,000 MWe reactors being built with Russian
collaboration at Koodankulam, the contracts
for these were concluded before the formation of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).3 The US
waived its objections to the sale of these reactors
as a special case. Any sale of new reactors to
India will have to be governed by NSG guidelines.
India may not be able to import any more reactors
from Russia or from any other country unless the
NSG guidelines are changed under the Indo-US
nuclear deal. This includes the four Russian reactors
for Koodankulam agreed to during President Putin's
recent visit to India. If for some reason India does
not reach agreement with the US, the nuclear power
Assessing the Indo-US Deal on Civil Nuclear Cooperation
There has been a lot of debate in India on the risks
associated with entering into civil nuclear
cooperation with the US. The deal raises inter-
related political, strategic and operational risks. The
Henry J. Hyde Act passed by the US Congress lays
down the legal framework within which the US must
negotiate the bilateral 123 Agreement with India.1
This critical analysis of the Indo-US deal assesses
the risks associated with entering into this deal and
suggests strategies to manage these risks. This
report also contains two annexures. Annexure I
analyses the major provisions of the Hyde Act.
Annexure II examines the economic implications of
creating and maintaining a strategic fuel reserve over
the lifetime of each imported reactor.
Building India's Nuclear Power Industry
Will the successful conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear
deal help or hinder India's nuclear power
programme?
According to the Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE), nuclear power will contribute 20,000 MWe
of capacity to the Indian electricity grid by the year
2020. The achievement of this target involves:
Completion of all ongoing 220 MWe
and 540 MWe Pressurised Heavy Water
Reactors (PHWR) projects.
1 The name 123 Agreement is derived from Section 123 of the US Atomic Act that deals with cooperation with other nations. India and
the US will enter into a bilateral agreement that will lay down the operational specifics of civil nuclear cooperation under this section
of the Act.
2 Meeting the Demand Projection. Available at http://www.dae.gov.in/publ/doc10/pg50.htm
3 The Nuclear Suppliers Group is an informal arrangement between the nuclear weapons States and a number of other countries that
controls the supply of nuclear fuel, materials , equipment and technologies to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapon technologies to non-weapon States.
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may not pose any special problems, this size may
still not be sufficient for nuclear power to maintain
its competitive position with other electricity
alternatives. As long as the international community
linked civil nuclear cooperation to India's weapons
programme, India did not have any choice. The
Bush-Manmohan Singh Agreement and the recently
enacted Hyde Act enable India for the first time in
more than thirty years to access global state-of-art
reactor technologies. Indian companies in the private
and public sectors can set up joint ventures with
companies from Russia, France and the US. If we
negotiate hard we may even be able to access some
non-sensitive high technology elements that can
improve the Indian industrial infrastructure to build
reactors of larger size that are comparable to
reactors being built in other advanced countries. The
recent Chinese agreement with Westinghouse
illustrates the possibilities that would open up to
Indian companies if the deal goes
through.
For such international collaboration
to take off it is essential that the
Indian government amend the
Atomic Energy Act and open up the
nuclear power industry to the private sector. There
seems to be a view that given national security
considerations, nuclear power should reside solely
in the public sector. There is no doubt that the
government should exercise complete oversight
authority over all nuclear-related activities. It should
also have a critical role to play with respect to
initiatives related to R & D and new technology
development. However, the operation of nuclear
power plants should be opened up for participation
by the private sector either by themselves or
in partnership with the public sector. Market forces
that will emerge from the resulting competition
will create an efficient, competitive and viable
nuclear power industry in the country. International
The Indian government must
amend the Atomic Energy Act
and open up the nuclear power
industry to the private sector.
projections for the year 2020 will have to be revised
downwards by 6,000 MWe to 14,000 MWe. This
would represent a direct economic loss to the
country.
Currently, India's largest reactor is the 540 MWe
reactor that has recently become operational.
Current plans of the DAE envisage further increasing
the size of these reactors to about 700 MWe and
creating the necessary infrastructure to replicate
these reactors in larger numbers. It may not be
possible to build reactors larger than 700 MWe in
the near future because of the current industrial
constraints in the country. Typical state-of-art plants
from various members of the NSG (including France,
Russia and the US) all have sizes that are at least
1,000 MWe. Several countries have plans to build
even larger sized reactors going up to about 1,600
MWe.
Nuclear power plants are capital
intensive. A large nuclear plant
requires higher initial capital
investments than the investments
required for a comparable size coal
or natural gas plant. They, like many
other alternative power sources, also offer technical
possibilities for achieving significant economies of
scale. Scaling up by reducing the investment costs
per MW of electricity produced, makes nuclear
power more competitive with electricity produced
from coal or natural gas. While nuclear power plants
have the disadvantage of high upfront investment
costs, they do have a significant advantage in terms
of low operating costs. Therefore, power from plants
of larger capacity will be cheaper than power from
plants of smaller capacity.This explains the global
trend towards larger reactors.
From the Indian viewpoint, while the scaling up of
the indigenous reactors from 500 MWe to 700 MWe
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constraints facing the nuclear power industry in the
country. The availability of uranium with higher
enrichment levels at lower prices will improve the
operational efficiencies of the installed nuclear
capacity. The deal will also allow Indian entities to
import reactors into the country. Such imports are
crucial if India wants to realize the target of 20,000
MWe of nuclear power by 2020. With some planning
this capacity can be increased to about 30,000 MWe
by 2020. The deal also provides India with an
opportunity to bridge the technology gap in reactor
size to make the Indian nuclear power industry
more competitive both in the domestic and global
marketplace. These are clear tangible short and
medium-term economic benefits that the deal will
bring to the Indian nuclear power industry.
The question that many critics of
the deal have raised however does
not relate to the short or medium-
term economic impact of the deal.
Many people think that the
widespread use and diffusion of
uranium based technologies that
would happen as a consequence of the deal would
delay or hinder India's logical transition into a thorium
fuelled nuclear energy economy. Some have
extended this argument to state that the US
intentions in backing the deal is to make sure that
India's emerging nascent capability in this vital area
is eliminated through the forces of market power.
How valid are these fears?
The three phase Indian programme involves a logical
transition from an initial uranium fuelled start towards
a nuclear power industry that is largely fuelled by
thorium. Since India has very large reserves of
thorium, the development of technologies that
facilitate its widespread use in Indian reactors makes
both economic and strategic sense. This approach
also involves an intermediate fast breeder
collaboration between companies in the nuclear
field will also increase economic inter-dependence
between India and its foreign partners in civil nuclear
cooperation. This will act as a stabilizing force in
case of any political downturns that might threaten
the deal.
Apart from the above mentioned technological
possibilities, joint ventures between Indian and
foreign companies will also increase electricity
production. If the Indian government can quickly
bring about the necessary changes in the Indian
legal and regulatory framework, new large reactors
could add capacity to the Indian power grid. Even
with very conservative assumptions we believe that
at least ten additional reactors with a capacity of
1,000 MWe each can be made operational by
the year 2020. This addition of 10,000
MWe to the nuclear capacity is a
tangible benefit to India under the
deal. This may not happen if India
does not finalise the bilateral
arrangements with the US.
There is also little doubt that India faces a serious
uranium shortage for expanding its domestic nuclear
power base at least in the short term. This fuel
constraint may also affect the operational efficiencies
of Indian nuclear power plants. The deal will make
available uranium fuel with higher enrichment levels
at lower prices. This will definitely have a positive
impact on the operation of Indian nuclear power
plants. While we have not been able to quantify
this benefit, it is our belief that a five to ten percent
improvement in operational efficiency is feasible.
Given the recurrent nature of power shortages in
the country this is quite significant. More importantly
these benefits can be realized quite quickly.
We can clearly see from these arguments, that the
Indo - US nuclear deal nullifies many of the major
The availability of uranium with
higher enrichment levels at
lower prices will improve the
operational efficiencies of the
installed nuclear capacity.
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technology step that is essential for establishing the
viability of the thorium route.
There can be no doubt that the R&D and technology
development related to the three phase Indian
programme is essential to preserve crucial options
necessary for meeting India's energy needs in the
post 2020 period. Mastery over technologies that
enable India to use its vast reserves of thorium
should be a key component of India's strategy for
energy security. However, these decisions are purely
internal Indian decisions. Any fears that US has a
Machiavellian mala fide plan to derail the three phase
Indian programme may be singularly misplaced.
Thorium based technologies are yet to be proven in
the commercial market place. They will emerge
as a consequence of R&D and technology
developments that are currently underway. It is
the job of the Indian political and scientific
establishments to preserve, protect and grow these
capabilities so that commercial
technologies relevant to Indian needs
emerge during the transition period.
Rather than worrying about US
intentions behind the deal, Indian
decision-makers should directly
address issues related to accelerating India's
transition to the thorium cycle. There is no doubt
that the sooner we achieve these breakthroughs the
better off we will be in terms of energy security. The
other question we should be asking is whether we
can advantageously use the deal and our status
as a responsible power with advanced nuclear
capabilities to accelerate our thrust towards the
thorium cycle.
A more worrisome issue that critics of the deal have
raised relates to India's rights to reprocess spent
fuel that is supplied to India under the deal. How
should India deal with the issue of reprocessing in
the proposed 123 agreement with the US?
The Indian three phase programme involves
reprocessing the spent fuel from the uranium fuelled
first phase reactors and breed them in the second
phase reactors to more effectively use the available
fuel base. Hence, India sees reprocessing as a
crucial step in the closed fuel cycle chain of activities.
Countries like France and Russia also believe
that reprocessing the spent fuel and using it in other
reactors is important from economic as well as waste
management considerations. Opinion in the US is
divided, not on the principle of reprocessing, but
rather on the economics of reprocessing.
What is more relevant for the Indo-US nuclear
deal however are the provisions in the Hyde Act
that bar the transfer of reprocessing technology to
India. The Hyde Act also clearly stipulates that the
spent fuel from Indian reactors cannot be sent back
to the US.
The Hyde Act only prohibits the
transfer of reprocessing technology
to India. It does not bar the
reprocessing of the spent fuel with
Indian technology in an Indian
reprocessing plant or with some
other technology in other foreign plants as along as
the reprocessing facility is under IAEA safeguards.
If India prefers to reprocess spent fuel in an Indian
facility it has several options. It can choose to place
one of its existing facilities under safeguards or it
can build a new facility and place it under safeguards.
Alternatively, it can negotiate to reprocess the spent
fuel in an unsafeguarded reactor that will be under
IAEA safeguards only during the period of
reprocessing of the spent fuel. The spent fuel could
also be sent to some other facility located elsewhere
for reprocessing. If private companies set up reactors
they may chose to reprocess the spent fuel or store
it depending on their perceived economics. In the
123 Agreement, India should try to retain the right
The Hyde Act does not bar the
reprocessing of the spent fuel
under IAEA safeguards.
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of India to use all these options. If the deal goes
through, spent fuel will be available for reprocessing
and use in about five years time. India should have
in place a concrete plan to use this fuel optimally to
advance both its R&D and operational capabilities.
Critics of the deal argue that the Hyde Act which
links civil nuclear cooperation to nonproliferation
concerns will limit India's strategic autonomy. Will
the deal get into trouble in case India carries out a
nuclear weapons test? How can India manage the
risk of disruption of fuel supply in the case of such
an eventuality?
The Hyde Act outlines the conditions under which
the US will be legally bound to
abrogate the deal. These conditions
are (a) nuclear detonation by India
(b) violation of MTCR, NSG
guidelines, or IAEA safeguards by
India under the nuclear civil
cooperation agreement. It is also
possible that the deal may be abrogated for political
reasons if Indo-US relations go into a tailspin.
A nuclear detonation by India is the most serious
and likely scenario under which the deal might be
abrogated. India may decide to test due to technical
or political reasons. For example, if the US resumes
testing for a new generation of nuclear weapons,
China, India and Pakistan may all need to follow
suit. Another reason for India to resume testing would
be if the international situation changes and China
or Pakistan test to upgrade their deterrent. India
would then need to respond. It can also be argued
that a third country connives with India's adversaries
to initiate tit-for-tat nuclear tests forcing the
abrogation of the deal. Under all of these
circumstances, the US would be legally bound to
abrogate the deal. It is however, possible that in case
India is responding to a nuclear test by either China
or Pakistan, the US might not be opposed to an
Indian test as a reaction.
India should keep open the option for conducting a
nuclear test and not commit to anything further than
a voluntary moratorium. To protect its right to test
India could include in the 123 Agreement a rebus
sic stantibus clause.4
Assuming that the US would be legally bound to
abrogate the deal in response to an Indian nuclear
test, what strategies can India
adopt in the long, medium and short
term to minimize the impact on
India?
The Hyde Act is a US domestic law
that is binding on US companies
doing business with India. One way to minimize the
impact of any sanctions in the case of a weapons
test is to ensure that all contracts that India enters
into are not directly with wholly owned US companies
but with those that are in joint venture or alliance
with companies in other countries.
The other option is to spread the risk and negotiate
agreements with other countries like France and
Russia which are not subject to US law. In an
increasingly global world, mergers and acquisitions
are almost daily occurrences. Who owns what is a
dynamic phenomenon. Managing this efficiently may
provide some legal leeway to India for managing
the situation arising from a weapons test. However,
4 A tacit condition attached to all treaties to the effect that they will no longer be binding as soon as the state of facts and conditions
upon which they were based changes to a substantial degree.  A complete exposition of the clause is available at http://law.enotes.com/
wests-law-encyclopedia/rebus-sic-stantibus
In India's case this would mean a change in the global or regional strategic environment requiring an Indian test as a response.
India should keep open the
option for conducting a nuclear
test and not commit to anything
further than a voluntar y
moratorium.
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one should assume that in spite of these measures
sanctions will be imposed at least for some time on
India in case of a nuclear test.
Regardless of the timing of an Indian nuclear test,
the following risks with regard to nuclear cooperation
will have to be managed by India to minimize the
impact of any sanctions.
Ongoing investments in the nuclear power industry
will have to be protected. One of the ways to protect
commercial interests would be:-
To try and negotiate a guarantee in all
commercial contracts that sanctions should not
apply to nuclear reactors that are
operational or under construction.
Such a clause would lay the
foundation for a mutually beneficial
risk management option for
both foreign companies and the
Indian power sector.
India can protect the physical nuclear power
infrastructure built under the deal by mandating
that ownership of reactors should be Indian. This
would bring all nuclear reactors operating in India
under the purview of Indian law and preclude
any unilateral or precipitate action by the US.
The Indian government can take insurance on
the nuclear power sector to absorb the financial
losses that may arise out of the abrogation of
the deal. This would be over and above the
standard commercial risk management options
entered into by Indian and foreign companies.
The above measures will, of course, not provide
guarantees against disruption in power supply.
However, this risk too can be managed as discussed
below.
The aftermath of the Pokharan II tests would seem
to indicate that the period of sanctions on commercial
Indian entities would not be for more than one or
two years. This period is likely to come down as
economic interdependence between the Indian
nuclear industry and the global industry increases.
The Hyde Act stipulates that fuel supply to Indian
reactors would take care of "reasonable reactor
operating requirements." India should negotiate to
maximize this definition while negotiating the 123
agreement.
The Prime Minister in a statement to Parliament has
indicated that under the deal India will build a
strategic reserve of fuel for each imported reactor
over its lifetime. As the Hyde Act
currently stand there is no
possibility of building this
'strategic reserve' of imported
fuel from the US. However, this
does not prevent India from
building this reserve from
alternate sources. India can
adopt a contractual template clause that ensures
that every imported reactor is required to be
accompanied by a minimum reserve of fuel as
specified by India. Explicit mention of these possible
arrangements need not be reflected in the 123
Agreement. India has the leeway to negotiate with
other members of the NSG to secure fuel over and
above normal reactor operating requirements. This,
however, could be contingent upon the degree of
US influence on these potential supplier states. The
Hyde Act stipulates that the US should not "seek to
facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear
exports to India by any other party if such exports
are terminated under United States law."
While the 123 Agreement should not prevent India
from building up a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel,
India should try to assess the implications of the
While the 123 Agreement
should not prevent India from
building up a strategic reserve
of nuclear fuel, India should try
to assess the implications of the
costs of such a reserve on the
cost of electricity generation.
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costs of such a reserve on the cost of electricity
generation. Our analysis of the costs of the reserve
indicates that if the reserve has to last the lifetime of
a reactor, which is currently about 30-40 years, India
would need to invest approximately one billion
dollars per 1,000 MWe reactor in procuring and
storing fuel. This will add at least $150 million a year
to the operating costs of each reactor and make
nuclear power economically unviable. India
obviously, cannot afford to ignore completely the
question of a strategic reserve either. However, the
volume of its strategic reserve must be guided by
both economic and political considerations.
From an analysis of inventory holdings of some
nuclear power plants in the US, it would appear that
the standard inventory held by most nuclear power
companies would cater to their fuel
requirements for about two years. It
would appear therefore, that over and
above this standard inventory, India
may need some additional safety
factors in case sanctions extend to
more than two years. A two to three
year inventory will not add appreciably to the cost of
power. However, a thirty or forty year inventory may
add significantly to the cost of power. While India
should aim for its right to build a strategic reserve,
the actual stockpile of fuel for each reactor should
be governed by the economics of power generation.
Annexure II analyses the economic impact of a
strategic fuel reserve over the lifetime of imported
reactors to make the point that a lifetime reserve of
fuel will make nuclear power generation
uncompetitive in India.
To further minimize the risk of fuel supply disruption,
India must negotiate in the 123 Agreement a
Statement of Principle that guarantees India
adequate time to switch suppliers in case the deal
is abrogated by the US. A similar Statement of
Principle must be included in all commercial
contracts with regard to fuel supply as a general
proviso for all supplier States and companies to
spread the risk of fuel supply disruption.
During the period between signing of the deal and
its possible abrogation, all Indian reactors classified
as civilian under the Separation Plan, could work
with imported fuel. This will release some fuel for
building up an additional reserve from indigenous
sources. Since this fuel would be required for power
generation if India does not sign the deal, it should
be possible to divert some of it to a reserve without
slowing down India's strategic programme.
In addition, along with the above measures that are
designed to mitigate the immediate impact of
sanctions, India must adopt a broad
based long term strategy with the
US and other major powers to
expand its economic relations with
potential partners for civil nuclear
cooperation. To ensure that the US
does not take any unilateral
measures to abrogate the deal, India must actively
encourage investment by US companies in the
Indian nuclear and power industry. Over the medium
and long term, this will ensure that company to
company level collaboration on both sides will
facilitate speedy resolution of any political disputes
between the two sides.
Civil nuclear cooperation is only one part of a larger
relationship that India must build with major powers
to ensure that it creates mutual trade and investment
dependencies that can act as shock absorbers for
any potential downturn in relations leading to an
abrogation of the deal. US-China relations are a
good example in this regard. US's growing threat
perception from China is offset by the growing
economic relationship between China and the US.
Civil nuclear cooperation is only
one part of a larger relationship
that India must build with major
powers.
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achievement of US objectives in Iran, there is
nothing in the Hyde Act that binds India to any
specific course of action with regard to Iran.
In case the 123 Agreement does contain a
prescription binding India's foreign policy options
to US interests in Iran, it would be wholly
unacceptable to India.
It has also been argued that the reporting
requirement mentioned in the Hyde Act with regard
to Iran may be used by the US at a later date to
arm-twist India into following a policy congruent with
that of the US. However, the reporting requirement
does not require the US administration to abrogate
the deal with India in case India's foreign policy on
Iran runs contrary to US interests. The reporting
requirement only empowers the US Congress to get
information from the administration about the level
of cooperation between India and the US on matters
relating to foreign policy.  It is an internal US process
that has no legal bearing upon the Indian
government or the conduct of civil nuclear
cooperation. Reporting to Congress is a requirement
in the US that the President must
fulfill. It is the right of the Congress
to be in the know about matters
relating to US foreign policy.
The Executive, however, is the
dominant actor in the formulation
and implementation of US foreign policy, a fact
clarified by President Bush after he signed the
Hyde Act. As argued above, unless the bilateral
agreement links the working and continuation of the
civil nuclear cooperation to specific Indian actions
with regard to Iran, there is little ground for arguing
that the deal would legally constrain the
independence of Indian foreign policy with regard
to Iran.
Currently, the US and India have broadly the same
goals with respect to controlling the proliferation of
Irrespective of the possibility of detonation by India,
India should take the following measures to ensure
its energy security in the long run.
Accelerate India's three stage nuclear
power programme to maximize utilization of
India's thorium reserves and reduce
dependence on imported sources of
nuclear fuel.
Speed up indigenous exploration and
exploitation of uranium in India.
Independence of Indian Foreign Policy
Will entering into the Indo-US nuclear deal increase
the risk of additional constraints on the
independence of India's foreign policy?
The question of independence of India's foreign
policy has invited strident criticism from the Left
parties and others who oppose the deal. The main
thrust of this opposition derives from Section
103(b)(4) of the Hyde Act that states
that it shall be the policy of the United
States to "secure India's full and
active participation in United States
efforts to dissuade, isolate, and if
necessary sanction Iran for its efforts
to acquire weapons of mass destruction including a
nuclear weapons capability and the capability to
enrich uranium, or reprocess nuclear fuel, and the
means to deliver weapons of mass destruction."
Under Section 104(c)(G) the President of the US is
also required to report to Congress and provide "a
description and assessment of the specific
measures that India has taken" to fulfill the above
objective.
Unless the 123 Agreement stipulates that Indo-US
nuclear deal will be conditional on India's support to
There is nothing in the Hyde Act
that binds India to any specific
course of action with regard to
Iran.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In fact,
under its WMD Act India is committed to containing
and preventing the proliferation of WMDs regardless
of the conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal.
Even though there is congruence in broad goals
of containing the spread of WMDs, it is possible
that India and the US may differ on the modalities
of achieving this objective. In such a case, does
the nuclear deal impose any constraints on
India's options? At the legal level, unless the 123
Agreement specifically mentions such a
condition, India is under no constraint to follow
US diktats.
In spite of these legal niceties the US could still
arm-twist India to toe its line. Does
entering into the deal make India
more or less vulnerable to US
pressure?
Currently, relations between India
and the US are dominated by the
US; although over the last fifteen
years, the relationship is steadily
moving toward a more equitable one. In the transition
period which India is currently going through,
it is dependent on the US for many things including
trade and investment. This makes India vulnerable
to US pressure regardless of whether India
signs the deal or not. This is a risk that the
political and the foreign policy establishment
will have to manage with or without the deal. Since
the nuclear deal is being signed during this
'transition' period, it is subject to these associated
risks. However, the nuclear deal also provides
India with political and economic opportunities for
moving Indo-US relations to a higher level of
interdependence at a faster pace. As economic
relations become the driver of Indo-US relations,
US leverage to politically arm-twist India is likely
to diminish.
What are the opportunities India will
forgo if it chooses not to sign the deal?
The Indo-US nuclear deal has de facto recognised
India's nuclear weapons programme. Under the
Separation Plan, India is free to develop, stock and
deploy nuclear weapons. The recognition of India
as a "responsible state with advanced nuclear
technology" provides India a unique status facilitating
India's participation in global nuclear trade and
R & D.  If India chooses not to go into the nuclear
deal, this unique status will be immediately
withdrawn. The nuclear deal is the only political
initiative that has taken India closer to being
recognized internationally as a nuclear weapon
State. This is a window of
opportunity that will  not be
available if India does not conclude
the deal.
If India does not sign the deal, it
stands to lose out considerably in
increasing its power generation
capacity in the next 10-15 years.
According to official projections, the indigenous India
nuclear power programme will have an installed
capacity of 20,000 MWe by 2020. Out of this 6,000
MWe is slated to be met by imported reactors. If the
deal does not go through this target is not
achievable. However, if the deal does go through,
India may be able to raise its installed nuclear
capacity to about 30,000 MWe by 2020.
The Indo-US nuclear deal opens doors for
Indian participation at international research
and development project like ITER and the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). India could
utilize the opportunities offered by civil nuclear
cooperation to enhance research and development
in Indian nuclear science. This can be facilitated
through joint research and development in nuclear
The Indo-US nuclear deal has
de facto recognised India's
nuclear weapons programme.
Under the Separation Plan, India
is free to develop, stock and
deploy nuclear weapons.
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engineering.  India could also identify and buy critical
research technologies. For example, Indian
participation in the GNEP could facilitate the
augmentation of nuclear R & D in India and reduce
dependence on the US for technology in the long
run. These opportunities would not be available to
India without the deal.
India will most probably face economic sanctions if
it conducts a nuclear test. These sanctions will be
imposed irrespective of whether India has or does
not have an agreement with the US on civil nuclear
cooperation. The Indo-US agreement on civil nuclear
cooperation will increase the interdependence
between the Indian and global nuclear industries.
The duration of the sanctions is therefore likely to
be much less if India and the US agree to cooperate.
On the other hand, if India does not sign the deal,
the sanctions period is likely to be of longer duration.
By going ahead with the deal India will create a
strong lobby of nuclear power companies in the US
that will advance Indian interests in case of a crisis
triggered by an Indian nuclear weapons test.
The foreign policy of any country is inherently
constrained by its political, economic or military
power. The question India has to answer is whether
the nuclear deal is likely to increase or diminish
India's political, economic and military clout. On
balance, it would appear that the deal will augment
rather than decrease India's stature in the global
arena. The nuclear deal while having manageable
political risks associated with it, offers India the
opportunity to become a more important global
player.
The nuclear deal provides India with opportunities
to increase India's nuclear power generation
capability. It also gives de facto recognition to India's
nuclear weapons programme and facilitates Indian
participation in global nuclear energy trade and
research. In case India decides not to enter into the
deal, it stands to lose much more than what it may
gain.
If India aspires to become a great power, it must
engage with the US and learn how to work with it
within the framework of its national interest. While
this path is not without risks, any alternative route
may not enable India to reach this goal.
 Recommendations
1. India should amend its Atomic Energy Act to
allow for private participation in building,
owning and operating nuclear reactors
in India.
2. Introduce investment protection clauses in
all contracts with all suppliers after the
conclusion of the 123 Agreement.
3. Ensure that the physical infrastructure
created in the Indian nuclear industry is
protected through appropriate legal means
against any unilateral actions from outside the
country.
4. Examine the possibilities of providing additional
insurance protection to the Indian nuclear
power industry.
5. Negotiate a Statement of Principle in the 123
Agreement as well as with other supplier states
that provides for sufficient lead times to switch
suppliers in case of possible disruptions in fuel
supplies.
6. India should actively promote its research
and development of new technologies to
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enable speedy transition towards an eventual
thorium based fuel cycle.
7. In the 123 Agreement, India should protect
all its options with regard to reprocessing
spent fuel. At the same time, an environmental
and economic assessment of reprocessing of
spent fuel is necessary to take the decision in
favor of reprocessing or storage.
8. India needs to spread the risk of the economic
impact of a possible abrogation of the deal by
making sure that it is not overwhelmingly
dependent on any single supplier country.
9. The above approach must, however, be
balanced by ensuring participation by US
companies so as to create a lobby in the US
that would promote the cause of India's nuclear
industry.
10. Negotiate a maximal  definition of a
"reasonable reactor operating
requirements" in the 123 Agreement. Ideally
India should pitch for a definition that is closer
to the concept of strategic reserve as defined
by the PM.
11. Operationally, however, the quantum of the
strategic reserve must be governed by
economic considerations to keep nuclear
power competitive with other sources of
power.
* The authors would like to acknowledge valuable inputs by Dr. K. Santhanam towards writing of
this report.
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Nuclear Detonation: The Hyde Act is clear that
exploding a nuclear explosive device by India would
terminate Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation. India,
however, is not bound by any legal requirement
to not detonate or to go beyond its unilateral
moratorium. It would be unrealistic to expect a
domestic US legislation to explicitly allow an Indian
nuclear test. It is for India to decide the benefits and
risks of such action. The issue of nuclear detonation
is related to the India's energy security and the
issue of fuel supply assurance which India must
satisfactorily address if it enters into the deal.
Transfer of Technology: The Hyde Act does not
allow for transfer of reprocessing, enrichment and
production of heavy water technologies to India.
India is, however, free to reprocess spent fuel under
safeguards. This has led many in India to argue that
"full civilian cooperation" has been denied to India.
Section 104(d)4 as explained in the Section by
Section Analysis accompanying the Hyde Act, states
that "Section (104)(d)(4) regulates US Cooperation
with India on the areas of uranium enrichment,
reprocessing and heavy water production. Under the
Atomic Energy Act, such cooperation is not restricted
but agreements for cooperation must specify if such
cooperation is to take place.  . . In 1999 when the
United States Government opted to expand US-
Australian nuclear cooperation to allow for
cooperation in the SILEX uranium enrichment
process, an amended agreement was submitted to
Congress for approval. The conferees intend that
should any such cooperation with India be
Annexure - I
Henry J Hyde United States - India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006
Analysis of Major Provisions
contemplated, either the original agreement for
cooperation would specify that such cooperation is
authorized or a subsequently amended agreement
would be submitted to the Congress."
This is not to argue that India would have access to
currently prohibited technologies but that there is
space for India to negotiate for amendment of the
current Act to enable access to them. Such a
precedent exists in the US. This is however, an
interpretation and also assumes that the political
approval for transfer of technology would be
forthcoming in the US Congress This would most
probably also require closer alignment of India's
strategic goals with that of the US.
Nuclear Fuel Supply: The Act does not provide for
"a strategic reserves of nuclear fuel over the lifetime
of India's reactors" as mentioned in the PM's
Statement in Rajya Sabha on 17th August 2006. The
Act only provides for fuel reserve "commensurate
with reasonable reactor operating requirements."
The definition of "reasonable reactor operating
requirements" is not specified. While it does not
assure India lifetime supply of fuel, it also does not
prevent India for negotiating for the maximum
possible reserve during the contractual negotiations.
Fallback Safeguards: Fallback Safeguards refers
to an US end-use monitoring program to be put in
place in case the IAEA is unable to implement its
safeguards agreement with India because of budget
or personnel constraints. This clause has been
softened in the final version of the Act. Fallback
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safeguards will take effect in the event that the IAEA
is unable to implement its safeguards agreement
with India. This provision seeks to assure the
nonproliferation lobby in the US that in case the
current international nuclear regulatory regime
implemented by IAEA is threatened, weakened or
becomes defunct, the US will have the legal right to
monitor India's safeguarded facilities.
Iran: "Statements of Policy" section of the Act says
that it shall be the policy of the United States to
"secure India's full and active participation in the
United States efforts to dissuade, isolate and if
necessary sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to
acquire WMDs, including a nuclear weapons
capability and the capability to enrich uranium or
reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to deliver
weapons of mass destruction."
There is also a reporting requirement on the US
President to inform Congress about the "specific
measures India has taken to fully and actively
participate in the United States and international
efforts to dissuade and isolate and if necessary
sanction Iran"
Neither the "Statements of Policy" nor the reporting
requirements are binding on India. India can choose
to align with the international efforts to resolve the
Iran issue under the aegis of the UN.
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The amount of enriched uranium (enriched to about
4.5%) required for operating a 1,000 MWe reactor
(with a burn up of 50 Gigawatt days per tonne of
initial heavy metal, a 90% capacity utilization factor
and a thermal to electrical conversion efficiency of
33%) is about 20 tonnes.5
Current prices of uranium (long term contract prices)
in the international market are approximately $1770
per kg.6 Spot prices will be much higher.
The cost of uranium fuel per year for a 1,000 MWe
plant with the above characterization is
approximately $35 million.
If each reactor that is bought under the Indo-US
agreement comes along with a life time stock of fuel
and if the lifetime of the reactor is thirty years, each
reactor would require about 600 tonnes of enriched
uranium fuel. The total cost of the inventory would
be about $1.05 billion per each 1,000 MWe reactor.
Even if we assume that we do not buy any further
fuel since we have a large inventory and we can run
down that inventory without any danger of sanctions,
additional operating costs are going to arise because
of inventory holding costs.
If the commercial lending rate is about 15% then
the interest charges will be an added burden on the
operating costs associated with nuclear power. In
the first year of operation this interest charge can
be as much as $159 million though as the inventory
Annexure - II
Implications of a Strategic Fuel Reserve over the
life time of a1,000 MWe reactor
depletes the interest cost would come down to
$ 5.31 million toward the end of life of the reactor.
The additional cost to nuclear power because of this
lifetime holding of a strategic reserve can now be
estimated for the first year of operation.
About 7.88 billion KWh of electricity can be produced
by a nuclear plant with the above specifications.
The additional cost with a lifetime strategic
reserve would be a cost of 1.92 cents per KWh
produced. In rupee terms this would translate into
an additional cost of approximately 90 paise per KWh
at current prices. Given that electricity prices today
is about Rs.2.50 per KWh this extra inventory holding
cost will increase the price of electricity per unit by
about 33% and erode the competitive position of
nuclear power.
The table overleaf indicates the impact of a lifetime
strategic reserve over a thiry year period on the cost
of nuclear electricity. We can see that a thirty year
inventory of enriched uranium will add about 90 paise
to the cost of each unit of electricity. On the other
hand, if we have an inventory of only one or two
years the additional cost incurred would only be
between 3 and 6 paise per unit of electricity at current
prices.
Clearly, if we want to completely negate the impact
of possible US sanctions, the inventory holding
should be for the lifetime of the reactor. The
5 "The future of Nuclear Power - an Interdisciplinary MIT Study" Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, available at http://
web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/
6 "The Economics of Nuclear Power" Briefing Paper 8, at http://www.uic.com.au/nip08.htm
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economic implications of mitigating this political risk
would, however, make nuclear electricity more
expensive and erode its competitive position with
respect to other sources of power.
What should be the optimum inventory given that
these political risks have to be managed in the
Indo-US nuclear deal?
Our assessment, based on some cases of valuation
of nuclear power plants in the US, indicate that
the typical fuel inventory held by nuclear power
companies in the US are for roughly two years. As
we can see from the following table a two year
inventory may only add about 6 paise to the cost of
a unit of electricity.
Experience from the past would suggest that the
maximum period of sanctions may be one or two
years. To make sure that there is no major impact
on power production we may want to keep an
inventory for one additional year. This three year
inventory will add about 10 paise to the cost of a
unit of power. This may not affect the competitive
position of nuclear electricity in a big way. Our
analysis would suggest that anything above five
years of inventory may erode the competitive
position of nuclear power.
In case negotiations with the US get sticky with
respect to the definition of "reasonable reactor
operating requirements" a case can be made out
for at least a two to three year inventory as necessary
for the operations of nuclear plants in India. While
we want to negotiate for the maximum position of a
lifetime strategic reserve we can see from this
assessment that such an approach does not make
much economic sense.
Our assessment has not included the additional
costs of storage and security that holding the
inventory will entail. This will add further to the
costs.
An easier way to deal with this issue is to make
sure that the US stake in the nuclear power
industry in India becomes significant. In such a
situation pressure from the US industry on the
US government will help in reducing the period
of sanctions. This diplomatic and political
management of the risk may be more appropriate
than working on a lifetime supply of nuclear
fuel.
This assessment is based largely on a study on
nuclear power carried out by MIT.
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Table 1
Cost of Holding Lifetime Inventory of Nuclear Fuel
(1,000 MWe Imported Nuclear Power Plant)
Electricity produced in
Billion KWh per 1,000
MWe reactor per year
Year
Enriched uranium
inventory in tonnes for
full life of reactor
Inventory holding




1 7.884 600 159.3 90.92
2 7.884 580 153.99 87.89
3 7.884 560 148.68 84.86
4 7.884 540 143.37 81.83
5 7.884 520 138.06 78.80
6 7.884 500 132.75 75.77
7 7.884 480 127.44 72.74
8 7.884 460 122.13 69.71
9 7.884 440 116.82 66.68
10 7.884 420 111.51 63.65
11 7.884 400 106.2 60.62
12 7.884 380 100.89 57.59
13 7.884 360 95.58 54.55
14 7.884 340 90.27 51.52
15 7.884 320 84.96 48.49
16 7.884 300 79.65 45.46
17 7.884 280 74.34 42.43
18 7.884 260 69.03 39.40
19 7.884 240 63.72 36.37
20 7.884 220 58.41 33.34
21 7.884 200 53.1 30.31
22 7.884 180 47.79 27.28
23 7.884 160 42.48 24.25
24 7.884 140 37.17 21.22
25 7.884 120 31.86 18.18
26 7.884 100 26.55 15.15
27 7.884 80 21.24 12.12
28 7.884 60 15.93 9.09
29 7.884 40 10.62 6.06
30 7.884 20 5.31 3.03
Calculations assume -  burn up of 50 Gigawatt days per tonne of initial heavy metal, a 90% capacity
utilization factor and a thermal to electrical conversion efficiency of 33%.
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